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NEW ECONOMICS OF OIL 
SPENCER DALE*  
Introduction 
The oil market has been at the centre of economic news over much 
of the past year: what should we make of the US shale revolution; 
how will the rebalancing of the Chinese economy affect demand; and 
most obviously, what are the implications of the dramatic fall in oil 
prices over the past year or so? 
The implications of these developments are far reaching.  For 
policymakers, responding to their impact on the prospects for 
demand and inflation; for financial markets, involved in the trading 
and financing of oil flows; and most fundamentally of all, for 
businesses and families across the world that rely on oil to fuel their 
everyday businesses and lives. 
As economists, when faced with questions about the oil market 
and oil prices, a natural instinct is to revert to the key principles and 
beliefs that we think underpin the operation of the oil market.   
Coming to the world of energy relatively recently – after spending 
more than 25 years in central banking – many of my core beliefs 
about the oil market stemmed from what I had learnt at school and 
university.   
In particular, much of my thinking was based around four core 
principles:     
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Oil is an exhaustible resource: it will eventually run out.  As such, 
as it becomes increasingly scarce, the price of oil is likely to increase 
over time relative to the prices of other (inexhaustible) goods and 
services.  The classic reference here is obviously Hotelling, which 
treats oil resources as akin to a financial asset, such that (in the 
simplest case) the relative price of oil increases in line with the real 
interest rate.    
Oil demand and supply curves are steep: i.e. they are very price 
inelastic:  demand because there are relatively few substitutes for oil, 
especially in the short run; and supply because once an oil company 
has invested huge sums of money in building an operating platform 
and the oil is flowing, the supply from that operation is not sensitive 
to fluctuations in the price:  you don’t turn the tap off just because the 
oil price falls. 
Oil flows from east to west: most obviously, oil is produced in the 
Middle East and flows to Europe and America.  The counterpart is 
that money flows in the opposite direction, leading to well-known 
issues associated with petrocurrencies and petrodollars. 
OPEC stabilises the oil market: for example, in 2008/9 with the 
global economy in deep recession, and oil prices plunging from $145 
to $35, OPEC cut production by nearly 3 Mb/d helping to stabilise 
prices.  Similarly, OPEC raised production sharply in 2004 when 
global demand suddenly surged. 
The individual toolkits that we each reach for when trying to make 
sense of the oil market will all be slightly different, with different 
elements and different emphases.  But my guess is that for many of 
us something like these four basic principles feature in them.   
If that is the case, we may need to think again. 
The oil market has changed very significantly over the last 10 or 
15 years.  The principles and beliefs that served us well in the past 
are no longer as useful for analysing the oil market.  We need an 
updated set of principles reflecting the New Economics of Oil.  
Two changes in particular have had a profound impact on the 
economics of the oil market. 
The most significant change stems from the US shale revolution:  
the rapid growth of on-shore oil production in the US, typically using 
hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) techniques to extract oil from shale 
and other types of so-called tight rocks.   
The second major change is occurring more slowly and arises from 
the increasing concerns about carbon emissions and climate change.  
Such concerns are, of course, nothing new.  But increasing 
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prominence is being given to them, in China and the US as well as 
Europe, and momentum for increased action is growing – particularly 
this year as the Paris talks approach.  If that sense of urgency 
translates into policies this could have significant implications for the 
long-run demand for all fossil fuels.   
Let’s look in more detail at the shale story. 
From a near standing start in 2010, US shale oil production has 
increased to around 4.5 Mb/d today.  Cost structures vary greatly 
across different regions and different plays, but most estimates 
suggest that the majority of US shale oil lies somewhere broadly in 
the middle of the aggregate cost curve (Chart 1).  
  
Chart 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although US shale oil accounts for less than 5% of the global oil 
market, the rapid growth in US shale oil was the key factor driving 
the collapse in oil prices last year: US oil production on its own 
increased by almost twice the expansion in global oil demand.  
Moreover, the different production techniques and financing 
structures found in the US shale industry have the potential to have a 
lasting impact on global oil market dynamics. 
The factors and forces driving the oil market today are different to 
those of 20 or even 10 years ago.  We wouldn’t take a monkey 
wrench and an oily rag to the digital engines found in today’s cars.  
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Likewise, we need to update our analytical tools to take account of 
today’s oil market.   
To take account of the New Economics of Oil.  
New Economics of Oil 
To consider what this might mean, let’s revisit the four basic 
principles I outlined and see how they are affected by recent 
developments. 
Revisiting Principle 1: Oil is an exhaustible resource 
The first, most basic, principle was that oil is an exhaustible 
resource. 
In its simplest form, Hotelling does not allow for the possibility of 
new discoveries of oil or for uncertainty as to how much can be 
extracted from a particular reservoir.  The total stock of recoverable 
oil resources is assumed to be known and the main focus is on the 
optimal pace at which these resources should be exhausted. 
But in practice, estimates of recoverable oil resources are 
increasing all the time, as new discoveries are made and technology 
and understanding improves.  And, importantly, they are increasing 
far more quickly than existing reserves are consumed.   
In very rough terms, over the past 35 years, the world has 
consumed around 1 trillion barrels of oil.  Over that same period, 
proved reserves of oil have increased by more than 1 trillion barrels.   
Put differently, for every barrel of oil consumed, another two have 
been added.   
Total proved reserves of oil – reserves of oil which, with 
reasonable certainty, can be economically recovered from known 
reservoirs – are almost two-and-a-half times greater today than in 
1980.   
Increases in available oil resources are nothing new.  But what has 
changed in recent years is the growing recognition that concerns 
about carbon emissions and climate change mean that it is 
increasingly unlikely that the world’s reserves of oil will ever be 
exhausted. 
Existing reserves of fossil fuels – i.e. oil, gas and coal – if used in 
their entirety would generate somewhere in excess of 2.8 trillion 
tonnes of CO2, well in excess of the 1 trillion tonnes or so the 
scientific community consider is consistent with limiting the rise in 
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global mean temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Centigrade.1  
And this takes no account of the new discoveries which are being 
made all the time or of the vast resources of fossil fuels not yet 
booked as reserves. 
There are many caveats and qualifications to this type of simple 
calculation.   
Most importantly, not all fossil fuels are alike:  coal is the highest-
carbon fuel and burning current reserves of coal would account for 
60% of those emissions.  It follows that coal is likely to be more 
affected by future climate policies than either oil or gas.   
Moreover, emerging technologies, such as Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS), mean that we may be able to find new ways of using 
fossil fuels for power generation which significantly reduce 
Greenhouse Gas emissions. 
But even so, the pace at which estimates of recoverable oil 
resources are increasing, together with growing concerns about the 
environment, means that it seems unlikely that all of the world’s oil 
will be consumed.   
How might this change our understanding of the oil market? 
Importantly, it suggests that there is no longer a strong reason to 
expect the relative price of oil to increase over time.  As with other 
goods and services, the price of oil will depend on movements in 
demand and supply. 
From the supply side, it might still be natural to assume that the 
relative price of oil will increase over time as it becomes increasingly 
difficult (and costly) to extract.  The most easily accessible oil is 
extracted first, forcing energy companies to dig deeper and deeper in 
increasingly difficult environments.   
But this increasing difficulty needs to be set against technological 
progress.  The oil industry, as with any other successful industry, is 
continually innovating and implementing new techniques and 
processes.   
The poster child for these advancements in recent years has been 
the US shale industry.  The use of increasingly sophisticated drilling 
techniques and huge improvements in cost efficiencies has allowed 
previously uneconomic resources of oil to be recovered.  Productivity 
gains within the US shale industry in recent years have been mind-
boggling.  Productivity growth, as measured by initial production per 
rig, averaged over 30% per year between 2007 and 2014 (Chart 2).       
                                                                                                                 
1. IPCC 2013, Fifth Assessment Report, Summary for Policymakers 
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Chart 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recognition that oil resources are probably never likely to be 
exhausted puts greater focus on future productivity trends when 
assessing the long-term outlook for oil prices.  The possible 
implications of the US shale revolution are particularly fascinating in 
this regard.   
The key point here is that the nature of fracking is far more akin to 
a standardised, repeated, manufacturing-like process, rather than the 
one-off, large-scale engineering projects that characterise many 
conventional oil projects.  The same rigs are used to drill multiple 
wells using the same processes in similar locations.  And, as with 
many repeated manufacturing processes, fracking is generating 
strong productivity gains.   
As you know, the strength of manufacturing productivity has led to 
a trend decline in the prices of goods relative to services.  A 
fascinating question raised by fracking – and its manufacturing-type 
characteristics – is whether it will have the same impact on the 
relative price of oil.  A key issue here is whether these types of 
repeated, standardised processes can be applied outside of the US and 
to more conventional types of production.  Can the discipline of lean 
manufacturing be applied to conventional oil operations?  
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Revisiting Principle 2: Oil demand and supply curves are steep 
Turn next to the view that oil supply curves tend to be steep, 
leading to large fluctuations in the oil price.  
The limited responsiveness of conventional oil supply to price 
movements stems from the significant time lag between investment 
decisions and production.  It can often take several years or more 
from the decision to invest in a particular field before it starts to 
produce oil, and once the oil is flowing, it will often last for many 
years. 
Shale oil (and fracking) completely changes this in two important 
respects.   
First, the nature of the operation in which the same rigs and the 
same processes are used to drill many wells in similar locations 
means the time between a decision to drill a new well and oil being 
produced can be measured in weeks rather than years.   
Second, the life of a shale oil well tends to be far shorter than that 
for a conventional well: its decline rate is far steeper.   Chart 3 
compares production data taken from a typical US shale well, in this 
case in the Bakken in North Dakota, with that from a Deepwater well 
in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM).  Daily production from the shale well 
declined by around 75% in its first year of production – a really steep 
rate of decline. The corresponding rate of decline for the GOM well 
was far slower. 
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These two characteristics – short production lags and high decline 
rates – mean there is a far closer correspondence between investment 
and production of shale oil.  Investment decisions impact production 
far more quickly.  And production levels fall off far more quickly 
unless investment in maintained.   
An important consequence of these characteristics is that the short-
run responsiveness of shale oil to price changes will be far greater 
than that for conventional oil.   As prices fall, investment and drilling 
activity will decline and production will soon follow.  But as prices 
recover, investment and production can be increased relatively 
quickly. 
The US shale revolution has, in effect, introduced a kink in the 
(short-run) oil supply curve, which should act to dampen price 
volatility.  As prices fall, the supply of shale oil will decline, 
mitigating the fall in oil prices.  Likewise, as prices recover, shale oil 
will increase, limiting any spike in oil prices.   
Shale oil acts as a form of shock absorber for the global oil market.    
It is important to be clear exactly why shale oil is likely to play this 
role.   
The short lead time between investment decisions and production 
means output can adjust relatively quickly. 
Equally important, the very high rates of decline of shale wells 
mean that operating costs in the shale industry – i.e. the variable cost 
associated with producing a barrel of oil – are a relatively high ratio 
of total costs.  The high decline rates mean, in effect, that shale 
operations have relatively low fixed costs.  This high ratio of variable 
costs to total costs increases the short-run responsiveness of shale oil.  
In contrast, more conventional operations tend to have a significant 
fixed investment component, for example, in the form of operating 
platforms, pipelines etc.  These sunk costs mean that the variable cost 
of producing an extra barrel of oil is materially lower than the total 
(all in) cost, dampening the responsiveness of conventional supply in 
the short run.   
To be clear: shale oil is the marginal source of supply only in a 
temporal sense.  The majority of shale oil lies somewhere in the 
middle of the cost curve.  As such, further out, as other types of 
production have time to adjust and oil companies have to take 
account of the cost of investing in new drilling rigs and operating 
platforms, the burden of adjustment is likely to shift gradually away 
from shale oil towards other forms of production, further up the cost 
curve.  
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There is one other interesting point to note when considering the 
supply of shale oil.  
Although its production characteristics should dampen price 
volatility, the financial characteristics of the independent producers 
operating in US shale may introduce an additional source of 
volatility.  
Conventional oil supply is dominated by large national oil 
companies and, to a lesser extent, large international oil companies, 
such as BP.  These companies are very big, with global footprints, 
producing huge quantities of oil every day.  They have relatively low 
levels of gearing, significant cash reserves, and an operating model 
which, in most times, ensures that the cash generated by the business 
is more than sufficient to cover capital expenditures.    
In contrast, the financial structures of even the largest independent 
producers operating within the US shale are far less robust.  The 
scale of activity is considerably smaller.  Typical gearing levels are 
far higher.  And, importantly, the vast majority of independent 
producers have negative cash flows; that is, they don’t generate 
sufficient cash from their operations to fund future investments.  As 
such, they are dependent on a continual supply of external finance in 
order to invest and produce. 
In macroeconomic speak, US shale has introduced a credit channel 
to the oil market.  And we all know from the misery of the financial 
crisis how destabilising credit and banking flows can be in 
transmitting and amplifying shocks.  Until now, the financial 
resources of the national oil companies and the large supermajors 
mean that the oil market has been largely insulated from the vagaries 
of the banking system.  But the small, heavily-indebted, independent 
producers that characterise the shale industry change all that.   
It seems quite likely that the scale of funding that enabled the US 
shale revolution to expand at the pace it did over the past 4 or 5 years 
would not have been available had global interest rates not been close 
to zero, with central banks using large-scale quantitative easing to 
encourage investors to invest in riskier forms of assets.   
Likewise, with the balance sheets of many shale producers now 
severely weakened by low oil prices, a key factor determining the 
supply of shale oil over the next few years will be the willingness of 
banks and creditors to continue to fund these businesses, especially 
as global interest rates begin to rise.   
The emergence of US shale oil has altered the nature of global oil 
supply.  The production characteristics of shale oil should increase 
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the price responsiveness of supply, dampening price volatility.  But 
the greater exposure of shale producers to the financial system means 
the oil market is more exposed to financial shocks.  
Revisiting Principle 3: Oil flows from East to West 
Consider next the presumption that oil predominantly flows from 
east to west.  Most obviously from the Middle East to Europe and the 
US.   
This traditional pattern of trade is also changing, reflecting 
developments in both the west and the east. 
In terms of the west, two developments are important. 
First, the demand for oil in the west is falling.  Oil consumption in 
the US and Europe peaked about 10 years ago and has been on a 
downward trend ever since.  This largely reflects the improving 
efficiency of motor vehicles, with fuel economy of new cars in the 
US, measured in terms of miles per gallon, around 20% higher than 
10 years ago.  And if anything, tightening regulation and improving 
technology mean that the pace of efficiency gains is likely to quicken 
over the next 20 years.  In BP’s Energy Outlook 2035, which looks at 
energy trends over the next 20 years or so, the EU’s consumption of 
oil in 2035 is projected to be back down to levels last seen in the late 
60s, even though EU GDP would have almost quadrupled over the 
same period.  
The second factor is the huge growth in the supply of energy in the 
west, particularly North America.  Over the past 5 years, the US on 
its own has accounted for almost two-thirds of the increase in the 
global supplies of oil and natural gas.  Added to that is the growth of 
Canadian oil sands.   
North America has become a major force amongst global energy 
suppliers. 
The impact of these two factors has had a huge impact on the 
dependency of the US on energy imports.  At its peak in 2005, the 
US imported more than 12 Mb/d of oil; comfortably the world’s 
largest importer of oil.  The growth of shale oil has changed all that.  
US import demand has more than halved over the past 8 years, and 
the US was overtaken by China as the world’s largest net oil importer 
in 2013.   
Looking ahead, we expect the US to become self-sufficient in 
energy by the early 2020s and in oil by the early 2030s (Chart 4).  If 
anyone, 10 or even 5 years ago had suggested that the US would be 
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self-sufficient in energy in their life time they would have been 
laughed at.  The US shale revolution has changed all that. 
In contrast, the fast growing economies of the Far East, 
particularly China and India, are becoming increasing dependent on 
imported energy.  As their economies grow, and the prosperous 
middle-classes balloon, China and India are likely to account for 
around 60% of the global increase in oil demand over the next 20 
years.2  This increase in oil demand will far outstrip local supplies, 
such that by 2035, China looks set to import around three-quarters of 
the oil it consumes and India almost 90%. 
 
Chart 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This changing pattern of energy flows has a number of potentially 
important implications. 
The most obvious are for the sources of demand that are likely to 
drive energy markets over the coming years.  The answer – as is the 
case for so many questions these days – is to look east. 
Next are implications for financial flows:  as energy increasingly 
flows from west to east, the funds to pay for that energy will travel in 
the opposite direction.  This has potentially far-reaching implications 
for our understanding of financial risks and asset prices. 
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The US current account deficit, along with China’s current account 
surplus, was a key part of the so-called global imbalances that 
foreshadowed the global financial crisis.   
Energy imports were a big part of this imbalance, accounting for 
almost half of the US current account deficit of 6% in 2007.  That 
energy deficiency has now reduced to around 1% of GDP, with the 
US set to move to energy self-sufficiency by the early 2020s.   
A key element in the global imbalances has completely changed. 
In a similar vein, this reduction in the US energy deficit is also 
likely to have contributed to the appreciation of the dollar in recent 
years.  Much of the discussion of the dollar’s appreciation has 
focussed on cyclical factors:  the relative strength of US demand 
growth and its implications for the timing of interest rate hikes.  But 
it is also important to recognise the important structural changes that 
have taken place as the US reliance on energy imports has been 
transformed. 
As well as energy and financial implications, the changing pattern 
of energy flows also has potentially important geo-political 
implications. 
It is inconceivable that the reduced dependency of the US on oil 
imports won’t affect its relationship with some of the key oil 
producers. 
Perhaps even more importantly, China’s increasing reliance on 
energy imports to fuel its future growth – and the associated concerns 
this brings about energy security – is likely to have an increasing 
influence on China’s foreign relations.  Indeed, it seems likely that 
the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – 
and the associated “one belt, one road” policy which has been a 
centre piece of President Xi Jingping’s first term – stems in no small 
measure from these energy security concerns. 
The pattern of energy flows is changing, with energy increasingly 
flowing from west to east, with far reaching implications for energy 
markets, financial markets, and geo-politics. 
Revisiting Principle 4: OPEC stabilises the oil market 
Consider finally the fourth belief I mentioned:  that OPEC acts to 
stabilise the oil market.  
Many commentators have interpreted recent developments as 
suggesting that the role of OPEC has changed.  That OPEC has given 
up its role as swing producer to shale oil.  Or that, rather than 
stabilising the market, OPEC has waged war on US shale. 
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I don’t think either of these suggestions are correct.  Indeed, in 
contrast to everything else we have discussed, I would argue that the 
role of OPEC has not fundamentally changed relative to the past 20 
or 30 years.   
Rather, the belief that OPEC would always stabilise the market 
was never correct. 
The power of OPEC to stabilise the market stems from its ability 
to vary supply inter-temporally: to increase or decrease supply from 
one period to another in response to shocks or fluctuations.   
As such, OPEC has considerable power to stabilise the market in 
response to temporary shocks, to either demand or supply.  
In terms of demand shocks, in 2008/9 at the height of the great 
recession, as oil prices plunged from $145 to $35, OPEC reduced 
supply by nearly 3 Mb/d, stabilising the market and boosting prices.  
Similarly in 1999, as the Asian financial crisis was hitting demand, 
OPEC reduced supply in order to support market prices.   
And on the supply side, as the Arab Spring caused significant 
supply disruptions in several oil producers in the Middle-East and 
North Africa, other OPEC producers – most notably the main GCC 
states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE – increased their supply to 
offset partially these disruptions.   
The ability of OPEC to respond to temporary shocks in order to 
stabilise the market has not changed.   OPEC still accounts for 
around 40% of crude oil production – close to its average over the 
past 40 years.  Many of the key producers still have the ability to 
control directly their levels of production.  And Saudi Arabia has the 
only significant margin of spare capacity. 
But OPEC has never had the ability to stabilise the market in 
response to structural shocks, at least not in a sustainable way. 
Suppose, just for a moment, that in 2008/9 there hadn’t been a 
severe global recession, but instead a mass-produced electric car had 
been invented overnight and had replaced our existing car fleet.  The 
impact on the oil market would have been similar in that the demand 
for oil would have contracted sharply and oil prices would have 
fallen. 
But the ability of OPEC to do anything about it would have been 
very limited.   
Yes: OPEC could cut its production; but only at the expense of 
giving up its share of an already contracting market to higher-cost 
producers.  And to maintain prices, it would have needed to give up 
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progressive amounts of market share in subsequent years as the 
number of electric cars increased.  This is not a sustainable response. 
The key point is that, unlike the global recession where demand 
was expected to recover at some point in the future, my hypothetical 
example of a mass-produced electric car is a persistent shock.  The 
economically sensible response to such persistent shocks is for OPEC 
to maintain its market share and let other higher-cost producers, less 
able to compete, bear the brunt of the demand contraction. 
We haven’t yet seen the invention of the mass-produced electric 
car.  But the emergence of US shale oil had a similar qualitative 
impact on the supply side. 
US shale, although more cyclical, is likely to be a persistent source 
of supply for many years to come.  Much of current shale oil 
production is situated somewhere in the middle of the cost curve.  
And the rapid pace of productivity improvements means that its 
competitive position relative to other types of production is 
increasing all the time. 
OPEC is no more able to wage war on US shale than it could on 
the electric car.  And it hasn’t.  Last year, as oil prices plummeted, 
OPEC stated that it would maintain its production target of 30 Mb/d 
and it did just that: producing an average of 30.1Mb/d in 2014.    
This doesn’t mean that OPEC has ceded its role of swing producer 
to shale oil.  To repeat: OPEC’s ability to stabilise the market in 
response to short-lived, temporary shocks remains largely unaffected.  
The greater responsiveness of US shale means that cyclical 
movements in shale production should also help to stabilise the 
market.  But OPEC’s role remains dominant. 
But when interpreting OPEC’s likely response to a change in 
prices it is important to ask why are prices changing?  Is it in 
response to a temporary shock or a more persistent factor?  A global 
recession or the mass deployment of an electric car? 
Conclusion 
The emergence of shale oil, together with growing concerns about 
climate change and the environment, means that the beliefs that many 
of us have used in the past to analyse the oil market are out of date.  
We need a new toolkit, a new set of principles, to guide our analysis 
of the oil market.   
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A new set of principles that reflect the New Economics of Oil. 
There are others far more able than me to work out exactly what 
this means in terms of formal models and frameworks.  But my 
instinct is that any new framework should include the following four 
principles: 
Oil is not likely to be exhausted:  As such, there shouldn’t be a 
presumption that the relative price of oil will necessary increase over 
time.  A key factor governing the future price of oil is whether the 
standardised, repeated, “manufacturing-like” processes characterising 
shale production, with the associated rapid gains in productivity, 
spread to other types of production. 
The supply characteristics of shale oil are different to conventional 
oil:  shale oil is more responsive to oil prices, which should act to 
dampen price volatility.  But it is also more dependent on the banking 
and financial system, increasing the exposure of the oil market to 
financial shocks.   
Oil is likely to flow increasing from west to east: with important 
implications for energy markets, financial markets, and geo-politics. 
OPEC remains a central force in the oil market: but when 
analysing its ability to stabilise the market, it is important to consider 
the nature of the shock driving the change in oil prices and, in 
particular, whether it is a temporary or persistent factor. 
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